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Hugh Collins*

Utility and Rights in Common Law
Reasoning: Rebalancing Private Law
Through Constitutionalization

In the evolution of private law, legal reasoning has always confronted the
fundamental problem of reconciling private interests with collective goods.
Philosophers analyse this problem of justice in terms of protecting individual rights
whilst at the same time maximizing utility or general welfare. The private law of tort,
contract, and property rights that emerged in the nineteenth century provided a
fortress of protections for individual rights, but the consequences for collective
welfare were quickly found wanting. These consequences were addressed by the
welfare state, regulation, and the separation of new spheres of private law such as
consumer law and labour law from mainstream doctrine, By the second half of the
twentieth century, however, these regulatory measures had triggered a marked
shift in private law reasoning as a whole, which became more instrumental or
policy oriented. It evolved into a hybrid of the old private interest reasoning and
modern policy oriented regulatory reasoning. At extreme moments, common law
reasoning was almost reduced to a variant of economic reasoning concerned
with maximizing wealth. In reaction, what is happening now is the search for ways
to rebalance the underlying values of utility and rights. The task is to construct
a legal language through which private law can be reoriented in ways which
both give full weight to a wide range of individual rights and at the same time
serve collective interests. The increasingly popular method for achieving this task
involves the constitutionalization of private law By grounding the principles of
private law in the general principles and abstract rights found in constitutions, it is
hoped to restore the balance between utility and rights. Yet this approach requires
new techniques for transforming the content of constitutional principles and civil
liberties. These public law principles need to be reinterpreted so that they make
sense in the context of the relations between private citizens. Furthermore, these
public law rights need to be extended into the social, economic, and cultural
sphere, so that they can address the questions of distributive justice that the
discourses of civil liberties leave unanswered.

* Professor of English Law, Head of Department of Law, London School of Economics. This essay is
a revised version of the Horace E. Read Memorial Lecture presented at Dalhousie Law School on 22
March 2007. Thanks for their comments and questions are due to members of the faculty and students
at Dalhousie and also to V. Mantouvalou.
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Dans l'evolution du droit privd, le raisonnement juridique s'est toujours heurt6
au probleme fondamental de concilier les int6r6ts priv6s et le bien collectif. Les
philosophes abordent ce probl~me de justice du point de vue de la protection
des droits individuels tout en maximisant I'utilit ou le bien-6tre g6n6ral Le
droit privd en mati~re de responsabilit6 delictuelle, de contrats et de droits
de propri6t6 qui a emerg6 au dix-neuvieme siecle a 6rig6 des remparts pour
est vite devenu evident que cette protection
proteger les droits individuels, mais il
avait des consequences f~cheuses pour le bien collectif. L'-tat-providence, la
r~glementation et la separation de nouvelles spheres du droit priv6 - notamment
le droit de la consommation et le droit du travail - de la doctrine g6n6rale, se sont
6ventuellement prdoccupes de ces consequences. Au cours de la deuxiume
moitiO du vingtieme siecle, cependant, ces reglements avaient provoqu6 un
changement marqu6 du raisonnement qui avait cours en droit priv6, lequel
devenait plus instrumental ou plus ax6 sur les politiques. Le droit priv6 a 6volu
pour devenir un hybride du raisonnement ancien qui favorisait les intur6ts prives
et du raisonnement moderne en matidre de r6glementation qui lui s'articule autour
des politiques. Dans certains cas extremes, le raisonnement de la common law
en 6tait presque r6duit I une variante du raisonnement 6conomique visant i
maximiser la richesse. On constate qu'en reaction . cela, on cherche aujourd'hui
des fagons de retablir I'6quilibre entre les valeurs sous-jacentes d'utilit6 et de
cr6er un langage juridique gr.ce auquel le droit
droits. La tiche consiste
priv6 pourra 6tre reorient6 de fagon 6 donner toute leur importance J un large
6ventail de droits individuels tout en veillant I ce que les inter~ts collectifs soient
prot6ges. La methode de plus en plus pr6conisse pour arriver I ce r6sultat
consiste ,constitutionnaliser , le droit priv6. On espere, en ancrant ainsi les
principes du droit priv6 dans les principes g6n6raux et dans les droits abstraits qui
caract6risent les constitutions, r6tablir I'6quilibreentre l'utilitaire et les droits. Cette
m6thode exige n6anmoins de nouvelles techniques pour transformer le contenu
des principes constitutionnels et des libertds civiles. II faut r6interpreter les
principes du droit public pour qu'ils prennent tout leur sens dans le contexte des
relations entre simples citoyens. De plus, les droits qui relevent du droit public
doivent 6tre 6largis aux spheres sociale, 6conomique et culturelle pour repondre
aux questions sur la justice distributive sur lesquelles les discours sur les libertus
civiles restent muets.

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

The integrity ofprivate law
The collectivist tide of the twentieth century
The character of hybrid legal reasoning
Rebalancing private law
Inserting human rights discourse in private law
Inter-textuality
1. Separate spheres
2. Private law conceptions of human rights
3. Social rights
Conclusion

Utility and Rights in Common Law Reasoning:
Rebalancing Private Law Through Constitutionalization

3

My lecture this evening offers an interpretation of the present character
of legal reasoning in private law. Drawn with a broad brush, my remarks
offer a description of legal thought in the common law of contracts, torts,
and property at the beginning of the twenty-first century. My interpretation
concentrates on some tensions that may be detected in contemporary
private law discourses and emphasizes possible future directions of
evolutionary developments in the methods of legal reasoning.
My subject is therefore not a particular topic in private law, but
rather it concerns how private lawyers think about legal questions. For
this purpose, I assume that legal reasoning in private law shares broadly
.similar characteristics, whether the issue may be analysed within the
categories of contract, tort, property or some other classification. The
examples used range over a number of these categories, though plainly
these few instances of legal reasoning in English law canot provide a
properly representative sample of reasoning in private law even within
one jurisdiction, let alone across many different jurisdictions. Without
denying that there are likely to be significant differences between the
different parts of private law and between jurisdictions, my contention
is that, at least at the level of general evolutionary patterns, it is helpful
to regard private law as a whole as comprising a distinct subsystem of
the law, with its own logic or particular discourse. In the language of
systems theory, my topic is about how private law thinks about issues
at the beginning of the twenty-first century and how this communication
system is likely to evolve.I I prefer to call this endeavour an interpretation
rather than a description, because what interests me most is not the history
of the evolution of legal reasoning in private law, but rather its potential
evolutionary trajectory. By understanding the tensions and dynamics of
the present, we can perhaps glimpse what the future may hold.
Through studies such as this interpretation, we can hope to develop
an understanding of contemporary forces that have a bearing on the
evolutionary trajectory of reasoning in private law. Yet the path that the
law will eventually take'remains contingent on choices between different
routes forward and on how lawyers respond to the variety of pressures
to which the legal system is exposed. My lecture contains a normative
message with regard to the question of what should be the response to the
I. For discussion of branches of law viewed as communication subsystems: Hugh Collins,
"Productive Learning from the Collision Between the Doctrinal Subsystems of Contract and Tort"
(1997) Acta Juridica 55; Hugh Collins, "Legal Classifications as the Production of Knowledge
Systems" in Peter Birks, ed., The Classification of Obligations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997)
.57. The terminology is derived from systems theory: Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
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contemporary predicament of reasoning in private law. This manifesto is
concerned with the relation between human rights law and private law:
on the interaction between fundamental rights, as declared in bills and
charters of rights, and the everyday laws of contract, tort and property
rights.
In a nutshell, my argument is that private law, having been reconfigured
in the twentieth century towards a more open-textured, policy-oriented
form of legal reasoning, must now seek to rebalance its treatment of
individual interests. and collective goals, or, in the words of my title, to
rebalance considerations of utility and rights, by incorporating human
rights discourses into private law. In making this argument, I reject a
number of other possibilities, ranging from proposals to rediscover natural
law foundations for private law rights to those that seek to reduce private
law reasoning to a cost/benefit calculus. Yet my argument does not support
a simple incorporation of human rights discourses into private law in the
2
manner sometimes described as the 'constitutionalization of private law.'
Instead, it is suggested that a method must be found to translate public law
ideas of rights into a form and content suitable for reasoning in private
law. This method may be better described by the terms inter-textuality or
inter-legality.
I. The integrity ofprivate law
Private law delivers on the liberal state's promise to respect the freedom
of individuals. Protection of civil liberties through public law secures
for citizens freedom from the misuse of state force. This public law
provides negative freedom for individuals. In contrast, private law enables
members of the society to use this freedom in constructive ways - to make
a home, to earn an income from business activities or ajob, and to acquire
possessions and enjoy services. The regulatory mechanisms, institutions,
and facilitative rules of private law - the rules of contract law, property
rights, and rules that protect personal interests against infringement by
other individuals - enable personal liberty to become a fruitful experience.
E.g., Christian Starck, "Human Rights and Private Law in German Constitutional Development
2.
and in the Jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court" in Daniel F. Friedmann & Daphne BarakErez, eds., Human Rights in PrivateLaw (Oxford: Hart, 2001) 97; Olha Cherednychenko, "The
Constitutionalization of Contract Law: Something New under the Sun?" (2004) 8:1 E.J.C.L. online:
<http://www.ejcl.org/81/art8l-3.html>; Martijn Hesselink, The New European Private Law (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) at 179-184; Mattias Kumm, "Who's Afraid of the Total
Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law" (2006)
714 German Law Journal 341; Harm Schepel, "The Enforcement of EC Law in Contractual Relations:
Case Studies in How Not to 'Constitutionalize' Private Law" (2004) 12:5 E.R.P.L. 661; Aurelia
Columbia Ciacchi, "The Constitutionalization of European Contract Law: Judicial Convergence and
Social Justice" (2006) 2:2 European Review of Contract Law 167.
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Private law constructs a framework of opportunities for individuals in cooperation with others to become authors of their own lives.3 In short,
private law assists individuals to enjoy positive freedom.
To deliver on this promise of effective and meaningful positive
freedom or the opportunity to use freedom to achieve well-being, private
law must necessarily construct a legal edifice that emphasizes individual
rights as well as rules and standards for conduct. To be valuable, to be
enabling rather than constraining, this positive freedom cannot be subject to
extensive government controls. Governments can and must set outer limits
Ito freedom of contract and rights to own property. The law must protect
the institutions of civil society from being subverted or abused. But to go
further, to review every detail of transactions and private arrangements, in
order to assess whether or not they conform to an official view of a good
way to live one's life, would be to deny substantially the original promise
of the liberal state of supporting positive freedom. If people want to spend
large sums of money to watch young men fighting on an ice rink, that is
their business, their choice about how to exercise their positive liberty,
no matter how pointless or distasteful being such a spectator to organized
brawling may'seem to others. To ensure that the exercise ofpositive freedom
is not subject to official administrative review at every turn, private law is
constructed as a system of rights or entitlements. The rights symbolize and
make concrete the point that the individual can choose independently or
autonomously how to exercise positive freedom. The individual's choices
about well-being are protected from interference by the state or by other
individuals by recognizing that these choices involve the exercise of rights
such as freedom of contract or the enjoyment of private property.
This framework of legal rights entails a particular style of legal
reasoning in private law. Legal reasoning seeks to provide detailed content
to the rights by establishing systematic bodies ofrules and principles. These
legal rules establish the scope of rights and determine how the rights of
individuals should be reconciled. Their systematic quality permits lawyers
to describe the scheme of entitlements and to determine how gaps in the
rules should be filled by reference to the surrounding legal materials. The
systematic character of the rules enables lawyers to discern underlying
general principles, which are generalizations regarding the structure of the
rules.

3.
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) describes extremely
well the kind of freedom or autonomy which private law (as well as public law) supports, with both
negative and positive aspects.
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These systematic and principled qualities of private law reasoning
created the possibility for most lawyers to regard this branch of the
law as engaging in a form of reasoning or discourse that was quite
distinct from questions of politics and of distributive justice. For some,
it was even possible to imagine that private law comprised the detailed
articulation of natural law principles or natural rights. In other words,
the rules of private law were regarded by some lawyers and scholars as
the embodiment of an immutable moral scheme waiting to be discovered
and articulated. Professors of private law, in particular, were attracted
to the prospect of presenting their discipline as the exploration and
systematization of the legal rules based on fundamental and immutable
moral principles. Often they presented themselves to their students
and readers as the priests of a faith in this coherent scheme of natural
justice. To write about the law of contracts, torts, unjust enrichment and
property rights, all that was required was deep knowledge of the rules
and precedents and the ability to think analytically and coherently. It was
unnecessary, so these private law scholars believed, to make political or
policy judgments when describing or even criticizing the law. In cases of
uncertainty or difficulty, appeals to coherence, consistency, and fidelity to
principle would suffice to resolve the issue, without the need to engage in
messy and controversial discussions about the social consequences of the
rules of private law. In short, analysis and discussion of legal principles
could be sharply distinguished from arguments about policy and politics.
These foundations in natural law and natural rights, though useful
underpinnings for justifying this interpretation of reasoning in private law,
were never essential to its legitimacy and effectiveness. It was possible to
insist that private law contained implicitly a coherent scheme of rights and
principles, even though this scheme might not correspond to any particular
moral or ethical theory. Instead, fidelity to the scheme could be justified
as both constituting the necessary respect for prior political decisions to
establish stability and social order and as satisfying the need to secure
the legitimacy of the legal system by ensuring its coherence and basis in
respect for rights. It is this position of respect for 'law as integrity,' without
being tied to a particular moral theory, which Ronald Dworkin articulates
4
so effectively.
II. The collectivist tide of the twentieth century
It has been widely noted, however, that during the last half century
or more, private law reasoning has not remained strictly faithful to this
4.

Ronald Dworkin, Laws Empire (London: Fontana, 1986).
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model of law as integrity. Lawyers and judges have increasingly invoked
collectivist considerations in their legal reasoning. These considerations
might be described as policy, or social consequences, or efficiency
considerations. Whatever the label given to these arguments, their crucial
characteristic is that they invoke collective welfare considerations as
relevant factors in the determination of private law issues find disputes.
No longer is private law confined to questions of principle and individual
rights. Lawyers and judges began to argue for a particular legal conclusion
by reference to the desired outcome for the community or society as whole
from the possible different rulings.
Consider one well-known example of this phenomenon: McLoughlin v.
O'Brian.' The issue in the case concerned recovery in the tort of negligence
for personal injuries. These took the form of emotional shock suffered by
a mother on seeing her husband and four children in hospital a few hours
after they had been gravely injured or killed in a car accident. Following
some not entirely clear precedent decisions, the trial judge had denied
recovery for emotional shock to the mother on the ground that she had not
been present at the scene of the accident. The Court of Appeal upheld this
decision, but it was reversed by the House of Lords. In both of the appeal
courts, several of the judges not only considered the precedents and general
principles of the law of negligence but also assessed what they called
policy considerations. They considered, for instance, whether permitting
liability in this case might have adverse consequences for the community
as a whole. There was the risk that recovery in this case might open the
'floodgates of litigation' or encourage fraudulent claims. More certainly,
recovery in this case would increase the cost of liability insurance, which
would make it more expensive for everyone to drive cars and might exclude
an even larger section of the community from being able to afford to drive
at all. Although ultimately these policy considerations were not regarded
as sufficiently strong to deny recovery, for many of the judges and lawyers
involved in the case there is no doubt that these policy considerations
played a vital role in the legal reasoning.
In Dworkin's discussion of this case, he seeks to show how it should
have been decided according to considerations of principle in line with his
model of law as integrity.6 He approves the approach of the minority of
the judges who emphasized the need to respect the principles of the law of
negligence, especially the principle that there'is a right to compensation
for reasonably foreseeable emotional and physical injuries that are the
5.
6.

[1983] 1A.C. 410 (H.L.), rev'g [1981] Q.B. 599 (C.A.).
Supra note 4 at 238-250.
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consequence of careless conduct. He disapproves of an approach that
would have reduced the issue to an economic question of which ruling
would diminish the over-all cost of accidents. It is clear, though, that a
majority of the judges followed neither of these approaches. They used
both Dworkin's approved method, seeking coherence in principle, but
they also embraced a collectivist stance, in which they assessed the
potential negative consequences for the community of applying the legal
principles. The majority of the judges employed both arguments ofprinciple
concerned with the rights and interests of individual and arguments of
policy regarding collective welfare.
It is this combination of arguments of principle and policy, or
arguments about rights and utility, which became characteristic of private
law reasoning in the second half of the twentieth century. What caused this
change? If we can understand the source of change, we may perhaps better
understand the dynamics of this style of reasoning and how it is likely to
evolve.
It is true, ofcourse, that the image of private law as a coherent system of
principles has been subject to a series ofdamaging intellectual challenges in
the twentieth century. Perhaps most prominent among the scholarly attacks
were the critiques presented by the American Legal Realist Movement. As
is well-known, these scholars insisted on a sceptical position with regard
to legal reasoning. They maintained that judges decided cases according to
policy considerations, particularly the likely social consequences of their
rulings, rather than applying rules or principles to the case at hand. Rules
and facts could always be manipulated to achieve the preferred result. From
the Realist perspective, legal reasoning was more mystification than a tool
of practical reason. These ideas could be taken further, as they were by
the Critical Legal Studies Movement, to insist that legal reasoning always
involved significant political choices because the underlying principles
were indeterminate in meaning and contradictory in values.
Although these ideas of the Legal Realists and the Critical Legal
Studies Movement indubitably influenced the way in which some legal
scholars described and taught topics in private law, especially the law of
tort, in my opinion their scholarly efforts were not particularly influential in
the mainstream courts and the bulk of private law writing. Legal reasoning
in contract law, property, and tort predominantly retained its traditional
rhetoric of individual rights, as articulated through rules and principles.
Students of contract law usually leam today about the rules of offer and
acceptance, of consideration, and the other doctrines that comprise the
subject as if the old ideas about private law being an immutable scheme
of rights were largely true. Judges continue to insist that questions of
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principle and their application to particular circumstances are central
to the task of adjudication in private law. The sceptical attacks on legal
formalism presented puzzles and challenges for private law reasoning,
but never dislodged the claims of integrity from their central position in
legal discourse. In my view, another influence on private law was far more
significant in subverting the traditional paradigm of a coherent body of
principles.
This disturbing influence emanated from what today in the common law
world we call 'Regulation' or social and economic regulation, though it has
other names as well such as 'Social Law' or 'Droit Social.' 7 This regulation
was enacted by legislatures and developed by administrative agencies
with the explicit aim of revising the operation of markets to achieve better
consequences for society as a whole. Regulation did not usually replace
private law. Instead, it attempted to reverse some of the consequences
produced by private law rules and principles. In some instances, such as
labour law, regulation was extensive, with the consequence that in many
countries the regulation effectively replaced private law rules for most
workers. In other instances, such as consumer protection measures, the
rules achieved marginal adjustments. In the case of unfair terms in standard
form contracts, for instance, regulation typically invalidated certain kinds
of particularly onerous terms without challenging the underlying private
law principle that standard form contracts are legally enforceable despite
the informational asymmetries.
Recent American accounts of regulation emphasize a narrower role
for such measures: to address externalities of private transactions.' An
example is pollution, which, owing to the difficulties of co-ordinating an
effective market response from all those adversely affected by pollution, is,
according to this American perspective, a proper subject for regulation. In
this account, regulation seems to be justified solely by reference to the
failure of an effective market to emerge rather than to correct the outcomes
of a market whether or not it is defective. This narrower account of the
role of regulation runs hand in hand with some justified, though in my
opinion exaggerated, 9 skepticism about the power of regulation to reverse
the outcomes of markets. It is questioned, for instance, whether consumer

7.
Lon Duguit, Le droit social, le droit individuel et la transformation de l'dtat (Paris: Alcan,
1908); Georges Gurvitch, L'ide du droit social(Paris: Sirey, 1932); Frangois Ewald, "A Concept of
Social Law" in Gunther Teubner, ed., Dilemmas ofLaw in the Welfare State (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
1986) 40.
8.
E.g., Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1982).
9.
Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 256.

10

The Dalhousie Law Journal

protection measures really help consumers, or merely induce traders to
find more ingenious methods of evading risks whilst increasing prices
and harming consumers. Or, in other examples, whether rent controls and
minimum wages actually increase rents and suppress wages in the long
run, thereby creating exactly'the opposite effect to that intended by the
legislature. I0 This scepticism about the effectiveness of social regulation
leads to doubts about whether such measures should be preserved.
We should not permit these American efforts to minimize the use
of regulation today to obscure its profound historical role in shaping
economy and society in the twentieth century. Whether misconceived or
not, governments attempted in the twentieth century to use regulation to
correct distributive outcomes produced by markets, whether or not those
markets were defective or failing. Employment law, for instance, sought
to provide workers with mandatory protections even though the labour
market worked competitively with only minor frictions and problems of
information asymmetry. The purpose of this social regulation was mostly
to reverse the outcomes produced by private law. Freedom of contract
produced terms of employment that seemed to construct brutal hierarchies
and opportunities for exploitation. Employment regulation responded in
various ways: by setting minimum standards, by providing protection
against abuse of power in the workplace, and by enabling workers to
improve their bargaining power in the market. This social regulation was
not primarily correcting market failure," but deliberately reversing the
outcomes produced by the system of rights established by private law. It
challenged the implicit values and ideology of the system of private law by
curtailing its positive freedoms for what were perceived as more important
social goals, such as distributive justice and fairer opportunity.
In the course of reversing private law in many contexts, this social
regulation presented an implicit challenge to the way private lawyers
conceived of their subject. My contention is that the presence of this
social regulation has had an unsettling effect on legal reasoning in
private law. Lawyers and judges could not ignore the omnipresence of
these separate legal schemes of rules that functioned as a further layer of
normative standards. Even in cases where no special regulation applied,
10. For a useful summary of the problems of regulatory backfiring see Cass R. Sunstein, "Paradoxes
of the Regulatory State" (1990) 57 U. Chicago L. Rev. 407 at 423: "In sum, redistributive regulation
will have complex distributive consequences, and the group particularly disadvantaged by the
regulation will typically consist of those who are already most disadvantaged."
11. Though certainly some labour law measures could be justified on grounds of market failure:
Hugh Collins, "Justifications and Techniques of Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation". in
Hugh Collins, Paul Davies & Roger W. Rideout, eds., Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation
(London: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 3.
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the courts were tempted to adopt similar patterns of reasoning when
developing the common law. In the law of contract these pressures became
evident in the 1960s and 1970s, when the courts began to consider the
protection of consumers as an appropriate role for private law even in the
absence of relevant social regulation. In tort law, the social policy ambition
of providing a method for compensating every individual who suffered
personal injuries in accidents, first represented in special statutes regarding
the workplace containing workmen's compensation schemes, gradually
infused the application of the law of tort to a wide range of situations
where injuries occurred. Lawyers began to discuss the proper scope of
the tort of negligence less in terms of rights, fault, and responsibility, and
more in terms of securing fair levels of financial support and economic
security to all those who had suffered a personal injury resulting from the
hazards and accidents of modem living.12
In some common law jurisdictions, at some particular moments,
the impact of the influence of social regulation on private law reasoning
was so strong that it might be fairly said that private law collapsed into
some kind of policy analysis. The legal rules and principles were almost
completely abandoned in favour of another kind of discourse. Often
economic analyses might be presented, but invariably lawyers also paid
close attention to factors that economists call 'equity' or lawyers might call
fairness, good morals, good faith, reasonableness, or justice. But, in my
opinion, those instances where courts and lawyers ignored legal principle
and concentrated exclusively on policy analysis were rare.
The traditional legal reasoning of private law was retained in the
multiple and persistent references to principles and precedents contained
in judgments and legal arguments. In the second half of the twentieth
century, what happened rather, in my opinion, was the development of a
form of hybrid legal reasoning, which sought to combine the chalk of legal
principle with the cheese of policy analysis.
III. The characterof hybrid legal reasoning
The central characteristics of this hybrid type of legal reasoning in
contemporary private law are the following. A judge or lawyer engages
in an explicit discussion of both the relevant policy considerations and
the position regarding rights in legal doctrine. These enquiries into both
policy and rights are presented initially as distinct, but when formulating
the rule by which to determine the case at hand, the policy considerations
12. E.g., Cecil A. Wright, "Introduction to the Law of Torts" (1944) 8 Cambridge L. J. 238; John
G. Fleming, An Introduction to The Law of Torts, 2"' ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) at i;
P.S. Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1970).
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are employed to manipulate the evolution of the legal principles. The
scope of principles and rights are narrowed or broadened, qualified and
supplemented, by reference not to other legal principles but rather as
justified by perceptions of the relevant policy considerations. Although
framed in the traditional terms of principles and rules, the consequences
of different policy choices are used to determine the exact shape of legal
doctrine.
This hybrid reasoning can be observed, for instance, in the leading
English case concerning wives as sureties for their husband's business
loans, BarclaysBankplc v. O'Brien.13 In giving the sole judgment, Lord
Brown-Wilkinson presents a section entitled 'Policy considerations,'
which commences by acknowledging the source of his knowledge about
the effects of private law regulation from the 'large number of cases of
this type coming before the courts in recent years.' Having considered
this evidence, he describes the regulatory policy in these terms:
It is easy to allow sympathy for the wife who is threatened with the loss
of her home at the suit of a rich bank to obscure an important public
interest, viz. the need to ensure that the wealth currently tied up in the
matrimonial home does not become economically sterile. If the rights
secured to wives by the law render vulnerable loans granted on the
security of matrimonial homes, institutions will be unwilling to accept
such security, thereby reducing the flow of loan capital to business
enterprises. It is therefore essential that a law designed to protect the
vulnerable does not render the14 matrimonial home unacceptable as
security to financial institutions.
This statement of regulatory policy makes it clear that the objective of
providing support to the construction of markets through the enforcement
of security must prevail over issues of fairness and justice concerning
occupation of the matrimonial home. The judgment then proceeds to
examine the preceding case law in order to discover the relevant legal
doctrines. As ever, this exercise is selective in its examination of the
cases, but it quickly becomes apparent that the selection is not governed
by reference to precisely similar cases. Rather the judge looks at a wide
range of analogous problems in order to establish some general rules. The
outcome of this exercise purports to be the discovery of a relevant principle,
the doctrine of 'constructive notice,' though it has to be remarked that this
principle had not been mentioned in this context in earlier cases. Yet even
this claim to be applying pre-existing principle is eventually abandoned

13. [1994] 1A.C. 180 (H.L).
14. Ibid at 188.
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when Lord Browne-Wilkinson makes it clear that for the future, whatever
their legal duties in the past, the banks should follow certain procedures
regarding disclosure of information and fair dealing when entering surety
contracts. He imposes a requirement upon banks to disclose information
about the nature of the contract, and to give a warning about the need to
obtain independent advice. He defends this requirement not on the ground
of precedent but on the basis of its suitability for achieving the instrumental
objective of upholding these contracts for the sake of the successful
operation of the capital market, whilst guarding against the misuse of
power within the family. In short, though the decision is presented in the
discourses of private law, with its references to rights and principles, the
evolution of the law in this case is openly determined by economic and
social policy considerations.
It may be objected that I am saying nothing new. It may be said that
judges have always considered policy even if they did not mention it
explicitly. Of course, that may be true - it is hard to tell. What interests
me is the Willingness of lawyers to refer explicitly to policy considerations
and to use them openly to justify particular developments in the law. The
point is not that policy considerations are mentioned. What is crucial is,
first, that the court feels it necessary to mention policy considerations in
order to provide an adequate justification for its decision, and second,
that the court explicitly describes how those policy considerations are the
drivers of the evolution of legal doctrine.
In other words, my first point about the character of hybrid legal
reasoning is that without the reference to policy, lawyers and judges
apparently think today that legal reasoning would not provide a sufficient
justification for a particular decision. In this respect private law becomes
similar to regulation in that it must be judged by its results measured by
welfare criteria, not just its coherent protection of principles and rights. To
put the point even more bluntly: a legal decision reached in accordance
with strict fidelity to principle that violates important policy considerations
which are already reflected in social regulation is now regarded not just as
an unfortunate decision but one that is probably a wrong aecision in law.
My second point about hybrid reasoning is that, if the court considers
it necessary to change or develop the law, though this evolution will be
constructed through modifications of legal doctrine, the new shape of
that doctrine will be justified exclusively by reference to its suitability for
achieving the policy goals recognized as relevant by the courts. It is not
simply that the court bears policy considerations in mind when developing
the common law. The insertion of policy considerations is not done merely
to help the judge in weighing up competing principles or rights. It is rather
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that the policy considerations determine the precise shape of the legal
doctrine, the details of the rules, and that this justification by reference
to policy is both necessary and sufficient. It follows, of course, that the
notion that the judge discovers the law, or merely develops it according to
existing principles, is hard to preserve when, in the course of judgment,
the court explicitly fashions the rule in order to achieve a particular set of
policy goals. The resulting decision will inevitably look like prospective
law-making rather than the evolution of existing principle.
Yet, in my view, private law of this hybrid kind does remain distinct
from social regulation. Despite the addition ofthe explicit and determinative
references to policy considerations, the commitment to the preservation
of a coherent body of principle remains present. Private law becomes
rather a kind of hybrid legal reasoning, one which both retains its fidelity
to the tradition of rights and principles whilst at the same time seeking
to replicate the reasoning processes of social regulation. Decisions have
to be justifiable by reference to both criteria - legal principle and social
policy.
IV. Rebalancingprivate law
The development of a hybrid private law has not gone
unchallenged. Reservations are expressed by scholars about the loss of
fidelity to principle, the incapacity of judges to perform the complex tasks
of policy analysis which they set themselves, and the obliteration of the
functional divide between private law and corrective social regulation - or
between determinations of rights and administrative policies. For some
scholars, such as Erndst Weinrib, the developments in legal reasoning
described above violate the essential characteristics of private law,"5 or, in
16
the words of Nigel Simmonds, represent the decline ofjuridicial reason.
I do not share those laments for a past, and perhaps mythical, age of pure
private law.
In my view, private law must always struggle with the endeavour of
how to cope with the competing concerns of individual and collective
interests. It can, never limit itself to an examination of individual rights
and corrective justice between two individuals. It must always have
regard to collective interests, to the distributive patterns produced by its
rules. Take, as an example, the problem of claims of workers who suffer
from mesothelioma (a rare form of lung cancer caused by exposure to
asbestos) but who are unable to prove which of their several past employers
15. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of PrivateLaw (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
16. N.E. Simmonds, The Decline of JuridicalReason (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1984).
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was responsible for introducing the harmful dust into their lungs. To look
at this issue solely in terms of individual rights, responsibility, causation
and fault, seems destined to produce the result that the worker cannot
obtain compensation from anyone on the ground that it is impossible to
prove who caused the illness or who is at fault. What that framework
of analysis lacks is the more collective perspective that emphasizes the
objective of securing compensation or economic security for workers
who are injured through no fault Qf their own and the possibility of
achieving that goal through some form of collective insurance. As in the
recent decision of the House of Lords in Fairchildv. Glenhaven Funeral
Services Ltd.,17 contemporary courts are likely to favour workers in these
instances, no doubt sometimes at the expense of fidelity to existing legal
doctrine, in order to achieve the social goal of compensation by using the
tort system and liability insurance as the mechanism. In this instance, a
court is necessarily balancing individual interests against collective social
policies. In my view it is right that it should do so. It is wrong to assume
that collective social policies will always be secured by fidelity to existing
legal principles based upon individual rights and corrective justice. That
would be as foolish as to assume that the free market always achieves
welfare maximization.
On the other hand, as mentioned at the beginning, the great strength
of private law, as opposed to other branches of the law, has been its
recognition that to achieve positive freedom and the consequent wellbeing that benefits from that freedom, the starting point of the law should
lie in individual rights and the protection of individual interests. There
is certainly a danger that the hybrid version of legal reasoning that has
come to the fore in recent decades might lose sight of this crucial insight
that formed the foundation of the systematic development of private law
in the nineteenth century. To that extent, the critics of the use of policy
arguments in private law have a valid point.
Yet, I do not believe that the way forward in private law reasoning is to
revert to the exclusive use of narrow doctrinal argument. That would betray
the achievements of the twentieth century in acknowledging explicitly that
private law must simultaneously look both to the individual interest in
positive freedom and the collective interest in securing general welfare,
recognizing that sometimes these considerations will exist in tension with
each other.
, Instead, I suggest that to the extent that a rebalancing between the
collective and individual interest may be required in the reasoning processes
17.

[2002] UKHL22, [2003] 1A.C. 32.
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of private law, it can be achieved by means of inserting fundamental
rights discourse into private law as another layer in the reasoning process.
This process, which is known in Germany as the 'constitutionalization of
private law,' involves private law reasoning directly engaging with the
norms or standards of the discourses of constitutional rights and liberties.
It will be necessary shortly to consider exactly how this relation between
public law rights and private law reasoning should be understood and
developed. Meanwhile the important point to grasp in my argument is
not so much the precise details of the linkage as the purpose of expanding
private law reasoning in this direction.
My central argument is that the resort to fundamental rights should
be understood as a mechanism for adding to the complexity of private
law reasoning for the purpose of placing a check on the inherent tendency
of contemporary hybrid reasoning to pursue policy considerations at the
expense of considerations of private autonomy or positive freedom. In the
case regarding asbestos, for instance, the reasoning of the House of Lords
starts with the principles of causation and a close examination of the
authorities. It then moves to policy considerations with a view to revising
those principles in order to construct an exception that will secure the goal
of compensation for the workers and their dependents. In these respects,
the case illustrates well the standard practices of hybrid reasoning in
private law. The introduction of a final stage in the legal reasoning of the
court, comprised of references to human rights and civil liberties, would
test that conclusion against these fundamental values. The question for
the court would be whether or not a judgment in favour of the workers
would violate or interfere with the fundamental rights of employers or
some other citizens. If such a right were unjustifiably interfered with by
the proposed ruling, such as the right to a fair trial or the right to peaceful
enjoyment of property, that interference would provide a sufficient reason
for blocking the ruling envisaged under the hybrid reasoning governed by
policy considerations. In the absence of a material interference with rights,
however, the evolution ofprivate law produced by hybrid reasoning should
be respected. If material interference with rights is discovered, that would
not necessarily mean that the ruling produced by hybrid private law should
be rejected. The important question would then become whether or not
the material interference was either disproportionate or discriminatory. If
the interference was found to be proportionate to the aims and avoided
unjustifiable discrimination, it could still be upheld.
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V. Insertinghuman rights discourse in private law
In the previous paragraph, I employed numerous technical terms, such
as proportionality, which are perhaps rather more familiar to those versed
in European human rights law and European constitutional discourses,
though I am sure that the underlying ideas concerning levels of judicial
scrutiny over legislative and executive acts are recognizable to most
lawyers. In order to help elucidate these terms and their significance here,
let me illustrate this model of reasoning in private law that encompasses
references to human rights, that is, the constitutionalization of private law,
with an English case which was ultimately called Wilson v. Secretary of
Statefor Trade and Industry(No 2). 1"
The contract in this case involved a six months loan of about £5,000
to Mrs. Wilson by a small lending bank known as First County Trust
Ltd. She gave as security for the loan her BMW car. When she failed to
repay the loan on the due date, the bank proposed to recover the debt,
which by then stood at nearly £7,500, by selling the car. Mrs. Wilson's
legal representatives persuaded ajudge to use powers under the Consumer
CreditAct 1974 to reduce the interest rate on the ground that at 94.98% it
was "grossly exorbitant" and therefore "extortionate" within the meaniig
of sections 137-138 of the 1974 Act. The interest rate was substantially
reduced by the court. Mrs. Wilson repaid the loan at the cost of £6,900 and
recovered her car. But there remained one outstanding issue concerning
the validity of the original written loan document. On appeal, the Court
of Appeal decided that the documents that comprised the loan agreement
included a small error in the statement of the amount of the loan or the
"amount of credit."' 9 The effect of that error under section 127(3) of
the Consumer Credit Act 1974 was that the court could not enforce the
contract against the debtor. If that conclusion was correct, Mrs. Wilson
could recover all her money back, that is, the £6,900 (plus interest at 8%),
because technically the bank had never had the right to sue her at all under
the statute.
At this point, the Court of Appeal asked whether this result involved a
material infringement oftheHumanRightsAct 1998,which is the legislation
that incorporated the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights into the law
of the United Kingdom. The Court ofAppeal concluded, after a rehearing,
that it did constitute a material infringement of human rights. The bank's
right to the peaceful enjoyment of its property was violated, and so too the
bank's right to a fair and public hearing before deprivation of its rights,
18.
19.

[2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 A.C. 816.
Wilson v. FirstCounty Trust Ltd., [2001] EWCA Civ 278, [2001] Q.B. 407.
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as demanded by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
had effectively been restricted. These interferences with the rights of the
bank could only be justified if they satisfied the test of proportionality. The
Court of Appeal reached the further conclusion that the interference was
disproportionate, with the upshot that section 127(3) of the Consumer
CreditAct 1974 was declared incompatible with fundamental rights, and
20
the bank was entitled to retain its £6,900 plus costs.
In order to defend the statute and its protection for consumers, the
Secretary of State launched a successful appeal to the House of Lords. The
precise ground for the decision was that the Human Rights Act 1998
did not have retrospective effect, so could not apply to transactions
entered into prior to its coming into effect in 2000. On the substantive
points, however, the House of Lords offered the opinion that indeed
there was a material interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment
of possessions. Nevertheless, the law lords agreed unanimously that the
statutory ban on defective consumer credit agreements was justifiable
because it satisfied the test of proportionality. In one of many observations
of this type in cases involving the Human Rights Act 1998,21 their lordships
exhibited strong deference to the judgment of Parliament on the issue
of proportionality, whilst retaining an oversight to intervene in some
instances.
Although this decision involves a statute, which might be regarded as
more in the category of regulation than private law, it serves to illustrate the
three dimensions of private law reasoning that I am arguing have become
a necessary and appropriate response to the evolution of hybrid private
law. First, the underlying traditional private law respects the contractual
and property rights of the parties: the bank is entitled to enforce its bargain,
but the debtor is entitled to the return of the security once the debt has been
repaid. Layered on top of this private law regime is a statute that seeks to
pursue various policies with respect to the protection of consumers who
get into debt with unscrupulous moneylenders. Although the common law
had provided some protection through equity, it had proved inadequate in
the context of the expansion of the consumer credit market. This regulation
revised the private law rights both to deprive the moneylender of the
20. Wilson v. FirstCounty Trust Ltd (No 2), [2001 ] EWCA Civ 633, [2002] Q.B. 74.
21. E.g., Lord Chief Justice Woolf: "It is ... important to have in mind that legislation is passed by
a democratically elected Parliament and therefore the courts under the Convention are entitled to and
should, as a matter of constitutional principle, pay a degree of deference to the view of Parliament
as to what is in the interest of the public generally when upholding the rights of the individual under
the Convention." R. v. Lambert, [2002] Q.B. 1112 (C.A.) at para. 16. Cf. Conor Gearty, Principlesof
Human Rights Adjudication(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 84.
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right to enforce extortionate interest rates, and to require transparency
in the paperwork, so that the consumer might at least have the chance to
understand the essential framework and details of the transaction. These
statutory provisions, in general, give a court considerable discretion
to rewrite the bargain, as happened in the Wilson case in respect of the
interest rate. In the case of material inaccuracies in the written document,
however, rectification was not regarded as an adequate remedy for the
consumer, so Parliament provided for the nuclear option of depriving
the creditor of any legally enforceable rights at all. The final layer of the
analysis questions whether this hybrid structure that pursues a mixture
of private economic rights and social policies does so in a way that
disproportionately interferes with those basic rights of citizens, which are
typically found in constitutional documents. It was this final question that
the House of Lords addressed when it concluded that the bank's inability to
enforce the transaction, though a material interference with a fundamental
right, was not an inappropriate and disproportionate way of pursuing the
legitimate goal of consumer protection.
In conducting this final layer of the legal analysis, the court has the
opportunity to consider whether the hybrid reasoning of private law has
lost touch with the underlying objective of providing a space for private
ordering, for permitting individuals to organize and enjoy their own lives,
without having to seek approval of the government or having to conform
to rules about how one should lead one's life. In essence, the Consumer
CreditAct 1974 states that one should not be permitted to lead the life of an
unscrupulous money lender, who charges the poor and needy extortionate
rates of interest, whilst disguising what one is doing behind misleading
documents or even avoiding any paper records at all. The reference to
human rights law enables a court to ask whether this interference with
a chosen way of life, namely being an unscrupulous moneylender, is
disproportionate in the light of the damage caused by these activities to
the poor and needy. This final step in the enquiry is necessary to ensure
that private law can continue to achieve its basic objective, which I have
described as facilitating the enjoyment of positive freedom.
VI. Inter-textuality
Having asserted the need for this human rights corrective to'hybrid
reasoning in private law, I want to insist on some more detailed structures
for this turn in private law reasoning to serve the aim of rebalancing private
law reasoning. There are three essential points to bear in mind.
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1. Separatespheres
The first proposition is that I am not suggesting that private law should be
incorporated into a single edifice or structure for the law with constitutional
rights at its apex. On the contrary, it seems to me important to preserve the
division between public law and private law in our thinking. We should not
require that one branch of the law should judge its validity by reference
to the standards of the other. We should no more determine the validity
of every private law rule by reference to public law principles than we
should test every administrative action of government to see if it satisfies
exactly the laws of contract, property, and tort. There are good reasons
why the law has evolved distinct functional subsystems such as public
and private law. These different branches of the law have co-evolved with
different types of human activity. The rules and normative standards have
been developed separately to solve the distinct co-ordination problems
and risks of abuse of power.
The new task, as I envisage it, is to protect the fundamental values
of private law, not to impose other values on it, no matter how much
we may respect those values. But those fundamental values of private
law, especially with regard to their concern for the realization of positive
freedom, also provide part of the motivation for the human rights standards
of public law. It is likely, therefore, that we will find considerable overlaps
in the rights or norms that we should consider.
The German terminology of the "constitutionalization of private law"
is therefore unsatisfactory, as it implies that somehow private law is being
subsumed within constitutional law. This notion, which is accurately
described by Mattias Kumm as a "total constitution" in which private law
is "a branch of applied constitutional law,"22 is not what is being proposed
here. It is important in my view to preserve the separation of private and
public law, since both aspects of law have co-evolved with their respective
spheres of social life - civil society with private law, and relations between
citizen and the state with public law. The separation of the subsystems
of public and private law evolved in response to the correct perception
that they were handling different kinds of conflicts and co-ordination
problems. It will not work to force the subsystems back together again,
with one having priority over the other. Nevertheless, for the reasons I
have given, it is necessary to re-establish a conversation between the rights
discourse of public law and private law in order to provide a safeguard
against potential unsatisfactory developments in contemporary hybrid
reasoning in private law.
22. Supra note 2 at 359.
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2. Private law conceptions of human rights
The second proposition follows from this preservation of the separate
normative subsystems of public law and private law. Although these
dimensions of the legal system may share many common general principles
in the sense of respecting ideas of freedom and autonomy of individuals,
probably there will emerge significant differences between private law
and public law in the meaning attributed to these fundamental rights. With
respect to freedom of expression or freedom of the press for instance, in
public law in a liberal society we are likely to regard any attempt at prior
restraint on publication by the government with considerable suspicion. We
must doubt the legitimacy of the state seeking to restrict the dissemination
of any ideas and information without the most compelling justifications
such as national emergency or national security. With regard to freedom of
expression in private law relations, however, the meaning of the concept
must alter because in this context we are concerned with the relations
between private citizens. Freedom of expression must be respected even
in these private relations, but it must be balanced against other interests
such as damage to reputation and the right to uphold contractually agreed
limits on that freedom as in the case of confidentiality clauses.
To make this point in a more technical way, the task of rebalancing
hybrid legal reasoning with references to human rights is not the same
process as giving indirect horizontal effect to constitutional rights in
private law. Indirect horizontal effect would imply that private law
is being required to conform to the standards of constitutional law
adjudication. The application of this concept of indirect horizontal effect
would suggest that courts when applying any aspect of the law, including
private and commercial law, should always observe public law rights
because they are binding on everyone, including the courts, in every task
they perform. This would render human rights standards an implied term
of every contract, or a determinant of the duties of care in tort. It would be
to transplant public law concepts wholesale into private law doctrine.
I think that such an approach mistakes the task facing the courts. It
is not indirect horizontal effect or a transplant that is required, but rather
"inter-textuality" or "inter-legality."23 The values found in expressions of
rights in constitutional documents need to be translated into concepts and
principles that fit into the structures and coherent principles of private
23. The terminology of "inter-legality" derives from theories of legal pluralism, where it seeks to
explain the types of communication possible between autonomous legal orders that operate within the
same territory where neither has a hierarchical relation to another, but it can be applied to complex
federal-like legal orders such as the European Union: see Marc Amstutz, "In-Between Worlds:
Marleasingand the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal Reasoning" (2005) I1Eur. L.J. 766.
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law. The two parts of the law, private law and public law, need to be
normatively compatible, whilst not expressing and articulating those
principles and rights in the same way.
Let me illustrate what this idea of inter-textuality means by considering
an example where the court failed to do what I am suggesting it should,
and instead followed the route of indirect horizontal effect. 24 The case
concerned a probation officer, Mr. Pay, who was employed to help criminal
offenders, including those convicted of sexual offences, to return to the
community. On weekends and in the evenings, outside working time,
he ran a small business selling goods used in sado-masochistic practices
- whips, chains, and leather outfits mostly. He sold these items at clubs
and on the internet. Even though this business was entirely lawful, his
employers gave him an ultimatum that he should either give it up or
be fired. He chose the latter course and brought a claim under UK law
for compensation for unfair dismissal. 2 The court accepted the general
proposition that I have been presenting: in order to determine the lawfulness
of the dismissal, the court agreed that it was relevant to consider whether
or not Mr. Pay's fundamental rights had been violated. A dismissal could
not be fair if it amounted to an unjustifiable interference with fundamental
rights. What fundamental rights had been violated? The court accepted
that the employer had interfered with fundamental right to freedom of
expression, but it held that the employer's desire to protect its reputation
was a legitimate goal to pursue and that dismissal of the employee was not
a disproportionate means by which to secure that goal. With regard to the
right to privacy, the right to have one's private and family life respected,
however, the court said that there was no material interference with the
right at all. Mr. Pay conducted his business in public, in the full glare of
the internet worldwide, not in private, so that the right to respect for his
private life was not engaged.
This legal reasoning uses the method of indirect horizontal effect or
transplant. It employs the meaning of the right to privacy that has been
established in public law and constitutional law cases, such as those
involving police surveillance of people in their homes or when making
telephone calls. The decision applies this conception of the right to privacy
directly to the private law context of a contract of employment. The
problem with that reasoning is that it ignores the substance of Mr. Pay's
claim: he had argued that what he does in his spare time, provided that it is
legal, is none of his employer's business. To discipline an employee for his
24.
25.

Pay v. LancashireProbationService, [2004] I.C.R. 187, E.A.T.
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hobbies and pastimes conducted outside working hours is, on Mr. Pay's
argument, a material interference with his private life. The court applied
the wrong conception of the right to privacy to the case. It was using a
public law concept in a private law context. This error arose from using
the method of indirect horizontal effect. In contrast, a reasoning process
based on the method of inter-textuality would not directly import legal
concepts and their meaning from another branch of the law. Instead, it
would translate the underlying concept, such as the right to privacy, into
principles which interpret the idea in a way that fits into and makes sense
within the context of private law.
In the new context of contractual relations, the meaning of the right to
privacy must be reconstructed in order to express the relevant features of
this ideal to this private law relationship. In most contractual relations it
should not be relevant to that relationship. what the parties are doing when
they are not performing the contract. Contracts create an autonomous,
limited commitment, as defined by the terms of the contract. Aside from
insurance contracts and some fiduciary relations, contracts do not require
utmost good faith or loyalty to the other's wishes or interests outside
performance of the contract. This circumscribed quality of contractual
commitments creates their utility for realizing personal freedom. The other
side of the coin must be that events that occur outside the performance of
the contract should be regarded as irrelevant, as private matters. In my
view Mr. Pay was correct to argue that his right to privacy was engaged
by his dismissal. Possibly an employer might be able tojustify termination
of the contract as a proportionate and necessary response in pursuit of
a legitimate aim such as protection of its business reputation. But this
issue of justification was not reached in this case, because the court used
the method of indirect horizontal effect. It applied the constitutional law
concept of fundamental rights instead of an inter-textual approach, which
would have translated these ideas of fundamental right into a conception
that makes, sense within the system of private law.
3. Social rights
My third proposition concerns the range of rights. A contrast is often drawn
between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and social and economic
rights, on the other. The former are commonly given full legal force in
constitutions and bills ofrights, whereas social and economic rights such as
the rights to education, to health care, and to decent work, are usually stated
as mere aspirations or not even mentioned at all in national constitutions,
though they are proclaimed in numerous international conventions such
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as the United Nations InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and
CulturalRights of 1966.26 Without entering into the debate about whether
or not this division between the categories of rights has coherent intellectual
foundations, we do need to address the question of the relevance of social
and economic rights to the proposed process of inter-textuality. When a
court applies the final stage of the reasoning process, in order to assess
whether the result produced by hybrid reasoning is compatible with the
fundamental values expressed in the ideas of human rights, should those
values or rights also include social and economic rights?
The case for adopting a broad scope of rights and for including
social and economic rights is linked to the origins of hybrid reasoning
itself. Social and economic rights can be viewed as the values that
underpin the regulatory interventions of the twentieth century, which
in turn, as I have argued, produced the evolution of hybrid reasoning
in private law. Social and economic rights can be viewed as a modem
way of expressing the collectivist values that were formerly described in
the language of utility and welfare. The point of describing these values
as rights is both to reinforce their importance as political values and to
promote a more egalitarian distribution of their benefits. In the case of the
right to shelter or housing, for instance, the goal of collective welfare will
undoubtedly be promoted if everyone manages to obtain a decent home
to live in; by describing this value as a right, the point is made that every
individual in society has, in principle, an equal claim to this benefit.
When a court reaches the final stage of reasoning in which the
outcome produced by the hybrid reasoning of both principle and policy
is tested against fundamental values that protect positive and negative
freedom, the emphasis will undoubtedly be placed on traditional civil and
political liberties. The central issue is whether a fundamental right will be
materially invaded by the proposed ruling, such as to award compensation
even in the absence of clear proof of causation by the defendant. In this
context, the court will be looking at civil and political rights including the
right to peaceful enjoyment of property. If the court is concerned about
the degree of material interference with such a basic right, the next step
is to assess whether or not the interference is disproportionate. It is at this
stage of justification that social and economic rights are likely to play an
important role.
References to social. and economic rights will tend to reinforce the
justification for the policy dimension of the hybrid reasoning. A social and
26. See also: Council of Europe, European Social Charter (revised), 3 V. 1996, E.T.S. 163; The
Charterof Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000 (C 364/01).
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edonomic right will provide a legitimate goal and emphasize its importance
in the assessment of the justification. In Mr. Pay's case, for instance, if
the issue had reached the justification stage on the matter of his right to
privacy, the court might then have balanced the interest of the employer in
its reputation as a legitimate goal against the social right of the worker not
to be unjustly dismissed. The worker's social right weakens the strength
of the employer's business interest, so that it has difficulty in justifying
such a strong response as dismissal to something that in the end, at most,
would have been embarrassing to the employer. In contrast, in Wilson's
case, it is less clear that the consumer protection measure of rendering the
loan unenforceable was justifiable by reference to a social and economic
right. The justification for this measure was therefore weaker, on a
borderline where one might expect courts to reach divergent opinions.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I am proposing that private lawyers should embark on a
project that is misleadingly labelled the constitutionalization of private
law. This project, I suggest, is necessary to help to rebalance private law,
which risks being diverted from its mission to secure the capabilities
to enjoy positive individual freedom as a result of developing a hybrid
form of legal reasoning that emphasizes the importance of collective
interests. Although the inter-textual approach to fundamental rights might
not affect the result in many instances of private law disputes, it would, I
suggest, secure a rebalancing between the perennial concerns of private
law, the competition between individual rights and collective welfare or
utility.

